Evanston Fire Department history Part 77

From Phil Stenholm: Another chapter in the story of the History of the Evanston Fire Department. THE GHOSTS OF THE EFD Between 1980 and 1981, the number of sworn members in the Evanston Fire Department (EFD) dropped from 114 to 106, eventually reducing further to 104 due to normal attrition. The role of Fire Equipment Mechanic was handed over to Fleet Services, and a civilian mechanic was brought in by the city to maintain the fire department's vehicles. These maintenance activities moved from the Fire Station #1 shop bay to the city yards. Additionally, when firefighters were out due to injury or illness, they were no longer replaced by extra firefighters assigned to each shift. Under an agreement with IAFF Local 742 and the City of Evanston, the minimum shift staffing for the EFD was set at 26 in 1980, marking the lowest staffing level since 1926 when Evanston's population was around 50,000. Back then, the EFD didn’t handle ambulance services either. Each of the two truck companies and five engine companies had a company officer and two firefighters assigned. Two paramedics were assigned to each of the two MICU ambulances, with the shift commander (F-2) overseeing the operation. As part of the 26-man minimum shift staffing, Squad 21 was pulled from active frontline duty and only manned by one firefighter from Station #1—typically someone from Truck Co. 21—when the specialized rescue equipment on board was needed. If there weren’t any available firefighters at Station #1, Squad 21 couldn't respond until a firefighter showed up to provide the necessary manpower. All three ambulances were stationed at Station #1. A-1 handled EMS and fire calls east of Asbury Avenue (inclusive), while A-2 covered west of Asbury. In 1985, after a couple of paramedics complained that A-1 got three consecutive calls during a Bears game while A-2 received none, one of the communications operators suggested eliminating the arbitrary Asbury Avenue boundary between A-1 and A-2. Instead, the two ambulances would alternate every-other call. Since both ambulances had the same equipment and were based at the same fire station, this seemed like a fair solution. This idea was quickly put into practice, allowing paramedics assigned to the non-active ambulance to stay longer at the hospital ER, perhaps do some shopping, or even take a shower, knowing the other ambulance would handle the next call. A minimum of six paramedics were assigned per shift, with two assigned to each ambulance and the other two to Truck Co. 21, which replaced Squad 21 as the "jump company" for the unmanned but fully equipped MICU Ambulance 3 at Station #1. If Truck Co. 21 wasn’t in quarters, Ambulance 3 couldn’t be staffed. Similarly, if Truck Co. 22 was out of service, Truck Co. 21 couldn’t staff Ambulance 3 even if Truck 21 was in quarters, as that would leave both truck companies unavailable. There were instances when Truck Co. 21 was in service and ready to staff Ambulance 3, yet a mutual aid ambulance had to be requested from Wilmette or Skokie simply because Truck Co. 22 was out of service. This happened before paramedics and advanced life support gear were assigned to all companies, so delays caused by waiting for an ambulance from neighboring towns could be critical. Vacations and Kelly Day absences were planned ahead and spread evenly throughout the year, so these absences could be covered by the five extra firefighters assigned to each shift. However, since it was impossible to predict exactly how many firefighters might be absent due to injury or illness on any given shift, off-duty firefighters worked voluntary "hire-back" overtime at time-and-a-half for the first eight hours of the 24-hour shift and straight time for the remaining 16 hours. On average, two firefighters were absent each shift due to illness or injury, so the seven positions eliminated stayed in the budget as "ghost" overtime slots. During the 1980s, IAFF Local 742 successfully negotiated a change in the arrangement, so firefighters working overtime received time-and-a-half for the entire 24-hour shift. At that point, nine "ghost" positions were needed instead of seven, leading to further reductions in EFD membership, from 106 to 104. While the nine "replacement" firefighters didn’t actually exist, the salaries of these slots remained in the budget and were pooled into an aggregate overtime fund, paid to firefighters working off-duty hours as illness and injury replacements. In January 1982, City of Evanston Police/Fire communications operators (collectively known as "Dispatch") took over all aspects of fire dispatching. Although half of a communications operator’s salary was funded by the police department and the other half by the fire department, operators received just one paycheck from the city. They wore an Evanston PD patch (with a "Communications" rocker above the patch) on their left sleeve and an Evanston FD patch on their right sleeve. A few months after police/fire communications operators assumed full fire dispatch responsibilities, the number of operators increased from seven to nine. Now, two operators were on duty at all times, instead of just one operator handling 9-1-1 calls and managing both police and fire radio traffic during the 11 PM–7 AM shift. This change occurred after two children died in an early morning house fire, and subsequent analysis revealed that the single operator on duty was overwhelmed by police and fire radio traffic and phone calls, leading to some mistakes being made. A police sergeant or lieutenant supervised the communications operators, with the fire department providing input regarding radio room operations related to the fire department but without direct supervision. Sometimes a police desk officer would work as a communications operator to cover absences, expected to handle fire or EMS calls, but firefighters were not allowed to work as communications operators. Prior to 1982, the Police/Fire communications operator would receive a report of a fire or medical emergency, "tone it out," and broadcast the information. Whenever possible, a firefighter at the Station #1 desk (referred to as "KSC 732—the desk" back then) would manage all further radio traffic related to the incident. Company officers kept their own logs, noting the time after every radio transmission. Under the new system, radio traffic from EFD units in the field was directed specifically to "Dispatch," and the operator was responsible for acknowledging and logging all radio traffic directed to Dispatch. Therefore, stating the time after every radio transmission became unnecessary. Around the same time, the EFD adopted a version of the Phoenix Fire Department's Dispatch & Incident Command System, created by world-renowned PFD Chief Alan Brunacini in the 1970s. EFD radio procedures underwent significant changes. Among other things, plain English replaced the "10-code," fire stations were referred to by their station numbers instead of their FCC-assigned radio call signs, daily radio tests were consolidated to one, and new incident command and fireground terminology replaced old concepts and jargon firefighters had used for decades. One of the communications operators was tasked with adapting the Phoenix Fire Department's communication operations manual to fit the EFD, such as changing a dispatch example from 2400 E. Van Buren to 2400 Main Street. In 1987, the city purchased a CAD (Computer-Aided Dispatch) system from ADT (a private alarm company) to help Police/Fire communications operators monitor hundreds of fire and burglar alarms connected directly to the Police/Fire Communications Center. The CAD system also provided automated logging of police and fire calls, replacing the pen-and-paper logs previously used by operators. Mobile data terminals (MDTs) were installed in EFD apparatus starting in 1994. On New Year’s Eve 1984, a fire destroyed the Byer Museum of the Arts at 1700 Hinman Ave. Besides the loss of a historic landmark (the building had once housed the prestigious "University Club"), most of the museum’s invaluable contents, including its unique "Treasures of the Orient" collection, were lost as well. Two truck companies from Evanston and a truck company from Skokie that responded on the MABAS box tried to save as much as possible, but the estimated loss was over $5 million. However, the estimated loss was later reduced to about $1 million by the insurance company after some of the items reported lost in the fire were found elsewhere, and the matter remained disputed in court for many years. If accurate, the initial $5 million loss would have been the highest ever recorded in an Evanston fire up to that point in time. The cause of the blaze was never definitively determined. FF/PM Dave Pettinger, the EFD’s lead investigator, believed the fire was suspicious since the fire alarm system had been disabled and no point of origin could be identified. However, EFD Chief Sam Hicks disagreed, attributing the cause to an electrical issue.

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